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NO. 1 JANUARY 2020 Introduction 
Repatriation to Turkey’s “Safe Zone” in 
Northeast Syria 
Ankara’s Goals and European Concerns 
Sinem Adar 
Following the US decision to withdraw troops from Northeast Syria and upon sepa-
rate agreements with the US and Russia, Ankara established what it calls a safe zone 
in the area between Tal Abyad and Ras al-Ayn. Even if spanning a smaller territory 
than envisaged, Turkey aims with its safe zone to impede Kurdish autonomy in North-
ern Syria, on the one hand, and to return refugees who have increasingly become a 
domestic policy challenge for the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP there-
after), on the other hand. Turkey’s plan for repatriation signals that its interests align 
with European interests in refugee return. Given concerns about the safety of refu-
gees, voluntary nature of return, and Ankara’s attempts at demographic engineering, 
Europeans should not support a Turkey-led repatriation to Syria without conditions. 
 
Since the eruption of the Syrian war in 
2011, Turkey has been adamantly advocat-
ing for the establishment of a “safe zone” in 
Northern Syria. Its motivations have, how-
ever, changed over time in line with its 
political priorities. Between 2011 and 2014, 
Ankara’s main concern in pushing for a 
safe zone in Northern Syria (including a no-
fly zone) was to topple Assad regime, and 
relatedly, to create a safe haven for its 
preferred anti-Assad rebels. The proposal 
remained during this time a matter of dis-
agreement between Turkey and the US. 
Upon the US decision in 2014 to cooperate 
with the People’s Protection Units (YPG), the 
military wing of the Kurdish Democratic 
Union Party (PYD) – an offshoot of the 
Kurdistan Worker’s Party (PKK) – in the 
fight against IS, and later, the involvement 
of Russia in 2015 in favour of the Assad 
regime, Turkey’s priorities in establishing a 
safe zone increasingly moved towards 
impeding a strong YPG/PYD presence in 
Northern Syria. The aim to curtail YPG/PYD 
became even more severe as YPG advances 
between 2014 and 2016 led to the founda-
tion of the so-called self-administration 
cantons in Afrin, Al-Jazeera, and Kobani 
(Ayn al-Arab). This together with the col-
lapse of the Peace Process in Turkey and 
the renewal of the civil war with the PKK 
in 2015 turned Northern Syria, for Turkey, 
into a security threat. 
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Humanitarian narratives 
Despite its shifting motivations in establish-
ing a safe zone, Ankara has been consistent 
in cloaking its political ambitions under a 
humanitarian cover. In the early years of 
the war, Turkey argued that a safe zone in 
Northern Syria would help settling inter-
nally displaced people. Reaching the limits 
of its institutional capacity to accommodate 
a high number of Syrian refugees that 
amounted to around 1.5 million by the end 
of 2014, Ankara earlier in March 2015 
partially closed the Syrian border, moving 
away from its open-door policy that had 
been in implementation since the eruption 
of the war. It also launched a 764-kilo-
meters concrete wall project alongside its 
911-kilometers long Syrian border. In the 
wake of the death of the three-year-old 
Syrian boy Aylan Kurdi in the Aegean Sea, 
then Prime Minister Ahmed Davutoglu 
criticized the international community in a 
speech he delivered on September 4 2015 in 
Ankara at a B20 (an integral part of the G20 
process representing the business commu-
nity) meeting for turning a blind eye to 
Turkey’s earlier calls for the establishment 
of a safe zone, and asked for cooperation 
towards humanitarian ends. 
Amid the high number of refugees trying 
to reach Europe in the fall of 2015 via the 
Aegean Sea and the human catastrophe 
that ensued, Turkey and Europe agreed on 
the EU-Turkey Statement in March 2016 
(preceded by the Joint Action Plan in 
November 2015), outlining the details of 
their co-operation over migration control 
and border security. According to the State-
ment, Turkey agreed to prevent irregular 
migration to Europe, and for every Syrian 
refugee returned from Greece to Turkey, a 
Syrian refugee in Turkey would be resettled 
in Europe. In return, the EU agreed to grant 
visa liberalization for Turkish citizens 
under a number of preconditions including 
complying with the EU’s data protection 
and antiterrorism laws; renewing accession 
talks; new negotiations on the customs 
union; and financial aid amounting to 3+3 
billion euros to address the urgent needs of 
refugees in the areas of education, health, 
security, shelter and food supply. 
Ankara has since then increasingly con-
tinued to play the refugee card towards two 
ends. The first has been the exclusion of 
YPG/PYD from the political process in Syria, 
which has since 2017 been primarily shaped 
via the Astana talks led by Russia, Iran and 
Turkey. For instance, then Prime Minister 
Binali Yıldırım suggested in November 
2017 during his visit to London that Turkey 
could renege on the EU-Turkey Statement if 
Kurdish forces in Syria were given a role in 
the UN-sponsored peace talks. Secondly, 
refugees were also increasingly instrumen-
talized by Turkey to gain international 
support for its reconstruction efforts in 
Northern Syria. Speaking in early Septem-
ber 2019 at a meeting of the AKP’s pro-
vincial heads, Turkey’s president Recep 
Tayyip Erdoğan threatened to reopen a 
route for Syrian refugees to enter Europe if 
the EU did not provide adequate logistical 
and financial support to restructure the 
proposed safe zone for refugee return. 
Particular features of Turkey’s 
safe zone proposal 
Neither conflating humanitarian action 
with political strategy in establishing a safe 
zone nor repatriation attempt is unique to 
Turkey. Both of these practices have in fact 
been common since the 1990s. Historical 
examples such as Rwanda and Northern 
Iraq demonstrate that the establishment of 
such zones often involved the overriding 
of states’ military and strategic interests 
over humanitarian goals. There is, however, 
something particular in Turkey’s proposal, 
especially since its first direct military in-
cursion in 2016 into Northern Syria. Con-
trary to previous cases elsewhere, Turkey’s 
current efforts do not intend to offer urgent 
and temporary humanitarian relief to civil-
ians trapped in conflict. For instance, a safe 
zone was established in Northern Iraq upon 
a joint initiative by Britain, France, and the 
US, citing UN Security Council Resolution 
688, because Turkey closed its Iraqi border 
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in 1991 to prevent the entry of Iraqi Kurds 
fleeing the war. Similarly, the French mili-
tary, authorized by the UN Security Council 
Resolution 929, intervened in 1995 to carve 
out a safe zone to protect the Tutsis and 
prevent a rapid influx of people into Zaire 
(now known as the Democratic Republic of 
the Congo). Unlike these earlier cases, Tur-
key’s efforts to build a so-called safe zone in 
Northern Syria are based on the assumption 
of permanent refugee return from Turkey. 
In this respect, Ankara’s plan to build in 
Northern Syria cities and towns with com-
plete infrastructure including hospitals, 
schools, mosques, homes, other facilities, 
and even plots of land to be distributed to 
the returnees gives its repatriation efforts a 
distinct character. The initial Turkish draft 
plan for a reconstruction project, which 
Mr. Erdoğan announced during his visit at 
the UN General Assembly in September 
2019, to settle around one million Syrian 
refugees in a safe zone with a length of 480 
kilometres would cost around 151 billion 
Turkish liras (24 billion Euros). According 
to the agreement reached by Turkey and 
Russia in Sochi on October 22, Ankara now 
plans to resettle refugees, the exact number 
of which is unknown, in the 120 km-long 
strips of land controlled by Turkey and its 
proxies between the towns of Ras al-Ayn 
and Tal Abyad. Article 8 of the agreement 
envisages Turkey and Russia to jointly 
launch efforts to facilitate safe and volun-
tary return of refugees. 
Safety, voluntariness and 
demographic engineering 
There is however enough to be worried 
about a Turkey-led repatriation. Firstly, 
allegations of human rights violations by 
Turkish proxies, and potential future con-
flict between the Turkish army and Kurdish 
forces cast doubt in the short-term on the 
security of such a zone under Turkish 
control. Safety remains a concern in the 
medium-term as well given that it is un-
clear at the moment whether the zone will 
remain under the control of Turkey or fall 
under that of the Syrian regime. In the case 
of the latter, existing practices of political 
suppression by the Assad regime over re-
turnees is perturbing. Thirdly, supposedly 
voluntary nature of the return is also 
subject to suspicion. Even though Turkish 
authorities have expressed their commit-
ment to the voluntary return of the refu-
gees, humanitarian organizations claim 
that Turkey has been deporting refugees 
to Syria on illegal grounds. 
Today approximately 3.6 million Syrian 
refugees live in Turkey under temporary 
protection status. Amidst the deepening 
economic crisis, hostilities within Turkish 
society against Syrians have been on the 
rise, forcing the ruling AKP to move away 
from its earlier policies of hospitality. Not 
too long after the re-run of the Istanbul 
municipal elections in 23 June 2019, for 
instance, Süleyman Soylu, the Minister of 
Interior, announced that those Syrian refu-
gees with temporary protection status who 
were registered in other Turkish districts 
had to leave Istanbul by 30 October back to 
the provinces in which they were regis-
tered, and those without papers were to be 
transferred to temporary refugee camps in 
order to be registered. Syrian refugees are 
reportedly forced to sign declarations of 
“voluntary” departure and face deportation 
to Syria under inhumane conditions, in-
cluding refusal of food. According to the 
UNHCR statistics, there has been a total of 
50,422 self-organized refugee returns to 
Syria from Turkey during 2016–2018. 
In addition to the doubts about safety 
and voluntariness, Northern Syria’s demo-
graphic composition is another issue for 
concern. For Ankara, a safe zone to resettle 
refugees seems to be synonymous with 
creating an “ethnic belt” in order to contain 
a strong YPG/PYD presence at its Syrian 
border. Even though Turkish authorities 
and pro-government think tanks argue that 
Turkey does not have any nation-building 
ambitions in Northern Syria, existing 
evidence about the governance practices in 
Turkey-controlled areas such as Jarablus, 
Al-Bab and Afrin raise suspicion. Four types 
of activity seem to dominate Turkey’s 
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governance practices in these areas: i) the 
formation of an Ankara-aligned political 
elite composed of Arabs, Turkmens, and 
anti-PYD Kurdish factions, ii) unequal 
political representation at the local coun-
cils, iii) demographic engineering efforts 
particularly via settling Arabs and Turk-
mens, and last, but not least, iv) setting up 
social and bureaucratic infrastructure, in-
cluding even issuing ID cards to residents. 
These existing practices invoke serious 
questions, in the case of a Turkey-led re-
patriation to the area between Tal Abyad 
and Ras al-Ayn, about who would return 
where, and by whom and how the process 
would be overseen so that at the minimum 
safety of returnees and voluntariness of the 
return are ensured. The Ministers of Foreign 
Affairs of Iran, Russia, and Turkey stressed 
in their joint statement issued on 29 Octo-
ber 2019 that refugees would return volun-
tarily to their original places of residence in 
Syria. Given its political aspirations for 
demographic and social engineering, how-
ever, to what extent Turkey will keep its 
promise remains ambiguous. 
Challenges and options for the EU 
Turkey’s pressure on the EU for financial 
contribution to resettle refugees in a Tur-
key-controlled safe zone will continue as 
the recent statements from Ankara demon-
strate. Given the changing dynamics on the 
ground especially after Turkey’s October 
2019 military assault, Europe should con-
sider leveraging its financial, logistical and 
diplomatic support to Turkey to ensure that 
repatriation happens on the basis of rights 
and protection. This, first and foremost, 
means, especially for the short term, that 
EU should not support a Turkey-led refugee 
return to Syria. Even if the political climate 
in Turkey but also in Europe appears to be 
favourable to the idea of refugee return, 
Northern Syria remains fragile and conflict-
ridden, with mid- to long-term perspective 
being unclear. Moreover, Assad regime 
seems determined to punish returnees 
whom it perceives as disloyal or threats to 
its survival. Under these circumstances, EU 
should continue investing in strengthening 
social and economic participation of refu-
gees in Turkey. To ensure an effective and 
efficient implementation of this goal, local 
actors such as municipalities and NGOs 
should be supported especially in areas of 
education and labour market participation. 
Continuing its financial and logistical 
support for social and economic participa-
tion of refugees in Turkey could increase 
EU’s leverage given Ankara’s recent warn-
ings to terminate the EU-Turkey Statement 
due to the current situation in Idlib. It is 
important that the EU firmly implement 
political conditionality and remind Turkey 
that the continuation of the Statement is 
dependent on Turkey’s commitment to the 
non-refoulement principle under internation-
al law. To this end, the EU should consider 
taking an active role in supporting coopera-
tion with UNHCR and human rights organi-
zations in monitoring the deportation al-
legations against Turkey. 
Relatedly, a coordinated European politi-
cal engagement with Turkey should also 
continue to prevent repatriation from be-
coming demographic engineering in the 
medium-term. This is, however, not an easy 
task given the diverging interests and 
understandings of Turkey and the EU about 
refugee return and reconstruction. The EU 
should insist on safeguards to ensure that 
Turkey (and Russia) fulfil their joint com-
mitment to voluntary return to original 
places of residence. These include involving 
UNHCR to monitor the safety of people 
once they have returned, and to ensure that 
they return to their places of origin. 
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